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INTRODUCTION
Marriageis a coming togetherfor better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an associationthat promotes a way
of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not politicalfaiths; a bilateral loyalty,
not commercial or socialprojects. Yet it is an associationfor as noble a purpose as any ....

More than 100 years ago, the United States Supreme Court held
marriage is "the most important relation in life" to an individual.2
The Court described marriage as "the foundation of the family and of
1. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
2. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
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society, without which'there would be neither civilization nor progress
....

"Sand

later "recognized that the right 'to marry, establish a home

and bring up children' is a central part of the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause." 4 From the earliest of times, marriage has been
"a status created by mutual consent of one man and one
defined ' as
5
woman.
However, despite hundreds of years of tradition and the forcible
efforts of conservatives to maintain the status quo,6 the definition of

marriage as it exists today may be about to change. Due in part to
publicity and heightened awareness of same-sex marriage issues resulting from the controversial Hawaiian case of Baehr v. Lewin, 7 two
states are currently considering legislation to legalize same-sex marriages.8 Nevertheless, the same awareness that has excited proponents of same-sex marriages across the nation 9 has evoked equally
fervent opposition from the conservative right wing. 10 Indeed, the
3. Id. at 211.
4. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923)); see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 495 (recognizing marriage as part
of the fundamental right to privacy guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
5. Grigsby v. Reib, 153 S.W. 1124, 1130 (Tex. 1913).
6. Conservatives Push Efforts Banning Same-Sex Marriages:Pending Court Case
in Hawaii Spurs Legislation Elsewhere to Deny Recognition, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, March 10, 1996, at 12A ("Fearful that a court case will lead to the sanctioning
of marriages of lesbian and gay couples in Hawaii by 1997, conservatives are
campaigning across the nation to ensure that the recognition of same-sex marriages
will not spread to other states."); Anne Ohmann, Buchanan's Words Speak Volumes,
Wis. ST. J., March 16, 1996, at 6A (quoting Patrick Buchanan as stating, "Homosexuals have declared war on nature," and "To put that kind of a relationship on the same
level as marriage is a moral lie."); Delia M. Rios, Gay Republicans Battle for Legitimacy in Party: Rising Bigotry May Divide Party as PresidentialRace Draws Nearer,
STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 24, 1996, at 16 (reporting Pat Buchanan, Phil
Gramm, and Alan Keyes attended a "marriage protection rally" to protest same-sex
marriage; Bob Dole, Steve Forbes, and Lamar Alexander sent letters of support to
the rally).
7. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
8. See L.B. 1260, 94th Leg. Sess. (Neb. 1995) ("A marriage between a man and a
woman, between a man and another man, or between a woman and another woman
is valid in this state."); S.B. 3112, 18th Leg. (Haw. 1995) (proposing amendment to
...
Hawaii Revised Statutes to provide for same-sex marriages); H.B. 2365, 18th Leg.
(Haw. 1995) (proposing amendment to Hawaii Revised Statutes to provide for samesex marriage).
9. See, e.g., Partners Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples, Legal Marriage Alliance of Washington, Lobby for Individual Freedom and Equality.
10. See, e.g., H.B. 1291, 60th Gen. Assembly, 2d R.S. (Colo. 1996) ("All marriages
contracted within this state ...

that were valid at the time of the contract or subse-

quently validated by the laws of the place in which they were contracted or by the
domicile of the parties are valid in this state, except marriages [between persons of
the same sex]."); H.B. 2262, 54th Leg., R.S. (Wash. 1995) (banning same-sex marriages) A.B. 1982, R.S. (Cal. 1996) (prohibiting California from recognizing same-sex
marriages performed outside the state). See also Rios, supra note 6, at 16 (reporting
Pat Buchanan, Phil Gramm, and Alan Keyes attended a "marriage protection rally"
to protest same-sex marriage; Bob Dole, Steve Forbes, and Lamar Alexander sent
letters of support to the rally).
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federal government recently became involved in the debate when congressional representatives introduced The Defense of Marriage Act."
The bill, inter alia, seeks to provide a federal definition of marriage,' 2
and would allow states to decide individually 13whether to recognize
same-sex marriages contracted in other states.
Since the battle lines are clearly drawn, the question becomes: Must
states recognize same-sex marriages validly contracted in another
jurisdiction? The potential outcome, at least in the state of Texas, is
the subject of this comment.
This comment avoids extensive discussion of the constitutionality 4
and the morality' 5 of opposite-sex marriage statutes. Regardless of
the constitutionality of statutes forbidding marriage between couples
of the same sex, it is improbable the current United States Supreme
Court will ever find a fundamental right exists to same-sex mar11. 142 CONG. REc. S4851-02. The constitutionality and affect of this legislation,
however, are largely outside the scope of this comment.
12. The bill defines marriage as "the legal union between one man and one woman
as husband and wife.. . ." Id. at *$4870.
13. Id. Since Congress is granted the power under the United States Constitution
to enact legislation to determine the effect of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, see
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, this would foreclose arguments that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause mandates that all states recognize these unions. However, even if states are
not required to recognize these marriages under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, in a
validity of marriage case each state must still determine under its respective choice of
law principles whether it will apply the forum state's law or the law of the jurisdiction
in which the couple married. Thus, notwithstanding the passage of The Defense of
Marriage Act, some jurisdictions may be required to recognize same-sex marriages
under their respective state's law.
14. The constitutionality of marriage statutes allowing unions only between one
man and one woman is a topic of frequent debate among proponents of same-sex
marriages. See, e.g., Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice-of-Law:. If We
Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 Wis. L. REv.
1033; Thomas M. Keane, Aloha, Marriage? Constitutionaland Choice of Law Arguments for Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages,47 STAN. L. REV. 499 (1995); Kevin A.
Zambrowicz, Comment, "To Love and HonorAll the Days of Your Life": A Constitutional Right to Same-Sex Marriage?,43 CATH. U. L. Rev. 907 (1994).
15. Despite some commentators' arguments to the contrary, it seems likely the
Almighty would side with the conservatives on this issue. See, e.g., Leviticus 18:22
(NIV) ("Do not lie with a man as one lies with a woman; that is detestable."). One
commentator notes that since homosexual conduct is prohibited in the Old Testament
and many of the old laws are no longer observed, such as admonitions against eating
the flesh of animals with cloven hooves, one cannot rely on the Old Testament's condemnation of homosexuality as an accurate reflection of true Biblical principle.
Jonathan Deitrich, The Lessons of The Law: Same-Sex Marriageand Baehr v. Lewin,
78 MARO. L. REV. 121, 136 (1994). Moreover, Deitrich hypothesizes that since Jesus
Christ never mentioned homosexual behavior in the New Testament, homosexual
conduct may be permissible within today's "Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards." Id. However, the apostle Paul warns on several occasions in the New Testament to refrain from homosexual behavior. Romans 1:26-27 (NIV) ("Men committed
indecent acts with other men, and received in themselves the due penalty for their
perversion."); I Corinthians6:9-10 (NIV) ("Neither the sexually immoral... nor homosexual offenders... will inherit the kingdom of God.").
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riages. 16 Nevertheless, because it is likely that some state will either
judicially or legislatively determine a right to same-sex marriage exists, it may be valuable to ascertain the effect of such a law on Texas
citizens.
Some commentators suggest the same analytical framework would
render different results for same-sex couples who marry and reside in
a state recognizing same-sex marriage and then move to Texas, and
those who live in Texas, travel to a same-sex marriage state only long
enough to marry, and then return home.17 Others suggest constitutional scrutiny demands that states - all states - validate such marriages, irrespective of strong state public policies, in accordance with
16. Notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court's consistent findings that
marriage is a fundamental right, it is highly doubtful that the Court will ever extend
its blessing to same-sex marriage. Although ten years have passed and the composition of the Court has changed since its landmark decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986), it seems likely the same outcome would result today. Thus, the
Supreme Court will continue to find that there is no fundamental right to engage in
homosexual intercourse and will extend this logic to conclude there is no fundamental
right to same-sex marriage.
In Bowers, the respondent was charged with violating a Georgia statute which
criminalized sodomy for all citizens. Id. at 187-88. The respondent challenged the
statute, arguing it violated the United States Constitution. Id. at 188. The United
States Supreme Court held there is no fundamental right to homosexual sodomy, emphasizing, "It is obvious to us that neither of these formulations would extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy." Id. at 192.
Perhaps most important to the current issue at hand is the Court's language regarding the morality of sodomy. Respondent argued there must be a rational basis for the
sodomy statute, and the only basis offered to support the Georgia statute was "the
presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is
immoral and unacceptable." Id. at 196. The respondent contended this rational was
inadequate to support the Georgia law. Id. Significantly, the Bowers Court
responded:
The law... is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed. Even respondent makes no
such claim, but insists that majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuality should be declared inadequate. We do not agree ....
Id. (emphasis added).
It should also be noted that the respondent did not challenge the statute on Equal
Protection grounds. Id. n.8. The Baehr case arrived at the same conclusion under the
Due Process claim, but the petitioners' challenge to the Hawaiian statute survived
based on Equal Protection grounds. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63, 67-68 (Haw.
1993).
Notwithstanding Bowers, however, proponents of gay rights argue that the
Supreme Court's recent decision to strike down an anti-gay rights amendment in Colorado is evidence that the Court would support same-sex marriages. See Romer v.
Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). In fact, as Justice Antonin Scalia noted in his dissent,
Bowers was conspicuously absent from this decision. Id. at 1631. Scalia, however,
stated: "If it is constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct
criminal, surely it is constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other laws merely
disfavoring homosexual conduct." Id. (emphasis added).
17. E.g., Anthony D. D'Amato, Conflict of Laws Rules and the Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages,1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 911, 942.
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the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. 18
However, it may be argued that this constitutional provision does not
apply in the context of marriage. 9 Regardless, it is unlikely that the
Full Faith
and Credit Clause will be outcome determinative in these
20
cases.
This comment examines the current mechanism for analyzing the
issue of whether same-sex marriages celebrated in another jurisdiction
will be recognized in Texas and suggests several areas the Texas Legislature should review to give certainty and consistency to any such decision. Part I reviews the Hawaiian case of Baehr v. Lewin2 1 and other
cases challenging opposite-sex marriage statutes, and outlines the public policy reasons historically offered to avoid recognizing same-sex
unions. Part II examines the Texas choice-of-law doctrine as it relates
to validity of marriages contracted in other states, and discusses Texas
public policy regarding same-sex unions and whether Texas state law
mandates recognition of a same-sex marriage validly contracted in another state if the couple is domiciled in Texas. Last, Part III briefly
reviews the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Due Process Clause
of the federal Constitution, and discusses whether these principles
should compel Texas to recognize same-sex marriages legally contracted in Hawaii or another jurisdiction.
I.

CHALLENGES TO MARRIAGE STATUTES

A. Baehr v. Lewin
According to the United States Supreme Court, "the right to marry
is of fundamental importance for all individuals. '2 2 Nevertheless,
over the last quarter-century, proponents of same-sex marriages have
made numerous unavailing efforts to challenge state statutes authorizing only marital unions between a man and a woman. Indeed, until
recently, there was no real question that a state could restrict marriage
to individuals of the opposite sex. However, in 1993, the Hawaii
18. See Habib A. Balian, 'Til Death Do Us Part: GrantingFull Faith and Credit to
MaritalStatus, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 397, 406-09 (1995); Robert L. Cordell II, Same-Sex
Marriage: The Fundamental Right of Marriage and an Examination of Conflict Of
Laws and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 247, 264-71
(1994).
19. Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 551 (1925) (holding that

"as marriage looks to domicil, membership [to a fraternal beneficiary society] looks to

and must be governed by the law of the state granting the incorporation"); see also
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930) ("Doubtless, a state may prohibit the

enjoyment by persons within its borders of rights acquired elsewhere which violate its
laws or public policy . . . ."). Moreover, if the United States Congress passes The
Defense of Marriage Act which was recently introduced in Congress, the Full Faith

and Credit Clause will clearly not require states to recognize same-sex marriages contracted in other jurisdictions. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Part III.B.
21. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
22. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (emphasis added).
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Supreme Court handed down the controversial case of Baehr v.
Lewin, 21 and its decision sent shock waves through much of the
country.
In Baehr, three same-sex couples alleged the Hawaii Marriage Law
was unconstitutional insofar as it barred them from receiving a marriage license.24 The petitioners' complaint alleged their applications
for marriage licenses were denied solely because the couples were of
the same sex. 25 Further, the petitioners alleged the denial violated
their right to privacy guaranteed under the Hawaii Constitution, as
well as to equal protection and due process of the laws.26
In answer to the petitioners' complaint, the director of the Hawaii
Department of Health (DOH), the defendant in the case, filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and to dismiss the petitioners'
case." Specifically, the defendant urged: 1) petitioners' complaint
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the
state's laws only contemplated marriage between a man and a woman;
2) the only legally recognized right to marry is a heterosexual marriage; 3) the state's marriage laws "protect and ... perpetuate the
basic family unit, regarded as vital to society, that provides. . . a nurturing environment to children"; and 4) homosexuals do not constitute a suspect class and hence only a rational basis is required for
statutes restricting their right to marry. 8 The trial court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss, holding the petitioners failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. 9
Holding the trial court erred in dismissing the petitioners' complaint, the Hawaii Supreme Court determined it must accept all factual allegations in the petitioners' complaint as true.30 First, the Baehr
court reviewed the petitioners' allegation that the Hawaii statute violated the petitioners' fundamental rights under the Due Process
Clause. 31 Although the court found the Hawaii Constitution encompassed all the fundamental rights recognized within the right to privacy under the United States Constitution, the court determined no
fundamental right to same-sex marriage existed under the Due Process Clause because the federal Constitution contemplated marriage
as a union between a man and a woman.32
23. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
24. Id. at 48-49.

25. Id. at 50.

26. Id
27. Id. at 51.
28. Id. at 51-52.
29. Id. at 52.
30. Id. at 54. A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support
of their claim that would entitle them to relief .... ." Id.
31. Id. at 55; see also U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
32. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 56.
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[W]e do not believe that a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted in
the traditions and collective conscience of our people that failure to
recognize it would violate the fundamental principles of liberty and
justice that lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.
Neither do we believe that a right to same-sex marriage is implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice
would exist if it were sacrificed. Accordingly, we hold that the applicant couples do not have a fundamental constitutional right to
same-sex marriage arising out of the right to privacy or otherwise.33

Next, the court examined the petitioners' equal protection claim
arising under the Hawaii Constitution. In Article I, Section 5, the Hawaii Constitution guarantees, "No person shall be... denied the equal
protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's
civil rights or be discriminated against in'
the exercise thereof because
of race, religion, sex or ancestry. ' 34 Noting the federal Constitution is
only the threshold of protection and the state may always extend
greater protection to its citizens, the court found the Hawaii Constitution indeed provided greater equal protection to its citizens than the
federal Constitution.35 Further, the court rejected the state's argument that the statute permissibly regulated marriage on the basis of
sexual orientation.36 Rather, the Baehr court found the Hawaii mar-

riage statute in question regulated the issuance of marriage licenses
based on the petitioners' sex. 37 Moreover, under the Hawaii Constitution, sex-based classifications are construed as a suspect category,
qualifying for strict judicial scrutiny, the highest level of constitutional
protection.38 As a result, the Hawaii Supreme Court remanded the
case, holding that the statute is presumed unconstitutional unless the
33. Id at 57.
34. HAw. CONST. art. I, § 5 (emphasis added). Cf.U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
35. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 65-66.
36. Id. at 67. ("[I]t is irrelevant, for purposes of the constitutional analysis germane to this case, whether homosexuals constitute a 'suspect class' because it is immaterial whether the plaintiffs, or any of them, are homosexuals."). Id. at 58 n.17
37. Id. at 64.
38. Id. at 67-68. It should be noted that the Texas Constitution also includes sex as
a protected class under the Texas Equal Protection Clause. "Equality under the law
shall not be denied or abridged because of sex .... " TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a. Further, the Texas Supreme Court has determined any classification based on sex is subject to strict scrutiny and may be upheld only if the state can show a compelling
government interest that is narrowly tailored to effect the interest. In re McLean, 725
S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1987). Thus, it is conceivable that a Texas court faced with a
direct challenge to the Texas Family Code, which prohibits issuing a marriage license
to two individuals of the same sex, could reach the same result as the Hawaii Supreme
Court. See TEX. FAm.CODE § 1.01 (West 1993). However, it is likely Texas courts
will find a way to avoid examining this issue as a sex-based classification, perhaps by
finding that the classification is based on sexual orientation rather than sex. See, e.g.,
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (although the statute in question prohibited
sodomy in general, the Court characterized petitioner's claim as homosexual sodomy). The Bowers analysis is important because based on the Court's decision, lower
courts have and will likely continue to argue the present challenges to marriage statutes are to validate homosexual marriages, rather than same-sex marriages. Provided
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state can demonstrate a compelling governmental interest for this sexbased classification and show that the statute is narrowly tailored to
accomplish this interest without intruding unnecessarily upon petitioners' rights under the Equal Protection Clause. 9 On remand, the
Baehr trial court is expected to render its decision sometime in 1996.
B.

Challenges to Marriage Statutes Priorto Baehr v. Lewin

Over the last twenty-five years, proponents of same-sex marriages
have made several unsuccessful efforts to challenge state statutes
authorizing only unions between a man and a woman. Indeed, until
Baehr v. Lewin,4" there was no real question that states could restrict
marriage to individuals of the opposite sex. Today, there seems to be
a real possibility that this is about to change. To fully understand the
arguments for and against this issue, as well as to review policy reasons which Texas may cite to avoid recognizing a Hawaiian same-sex
marriage, it is helpful to look at past challenges to state marriage
statutes.
In 1971, the Supreme Court of Minnesota faced the issue of samesex marriages in Baker v. Nelson.41 In Baker, two men applied for a
marriage license and were refused because they were of the same
sex.42 The petitioners contended first that the absence of an express
prohibition against same-sex marriages evidenced legislative intent to
allow such marriages.43 Second, the petitioners argued that if the statute prohibited same-sex marriages, it unconstitutionally violated their
rights to equal protection and due process under the law."
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected both arguments, stating,
"[t]he due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a charter for restructuring ... [the institution of marriage] by judicial legislation."4 5 First, the court noted, a "sensible reading of the statute"
revealed the Minnesota Legislature never intended to authorize samesex marriage.46 "[The Minnesota statute] which governs 'marriage'
employs that term as one of common usage, meaning the state of union
the petitioners in question are homosexuals, this rationalization will likely be upheld
as valid, based on Bowers.
Further, even if a court determines this is a sex-based distinction, at least one Texas
court has held that "[o]ur law allows sex-based distinctions if physical characteristics
requires those distinctions." Messina v. Texas, 904 S.W.2d 178, 181 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, no writ). Thus, a court may also find that the physical characteristics constituting a "husband" and "wife" require sex-based distinctions.
39. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
40. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
41. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
42. Id. at 185.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 186.
45. Il
46. Id at 185.
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between persons of the opposite sex."4 7 The court also noted the institution of marriage is one between a man and a woman that "uniquely
involv[es] the procreation... of children, '4 8 an accomplishment that
same-sex couples clearly cannot duplicate.
Regarding equal protection, the petitioners argued that since the
state did not impose a condition on opposite-sex married couples that
they be willing or able to procreate, it could not use procreation as a
rationale to prohibit same-sex marriages.4 9 Nevertheless, the Baker
court determined the Fourteenth Amendment does not demand "abstract symmetry. ' 50 Further, the court noted there is an essential distinction between marital restrictions based on race, which are void,
and restrictions based on gender, which are permissible.5 1 Consequently, "[t]he equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
like the due process clause, is not offended by the state's classification

of persons authorized to marry. "'52

The following year, in Burkett v. Zablocki,53 two women in Wisconsin sought a declaration of their right to marry and an order to compel
the county clerk to issue them a marriage license, contending this right
to marry was granted to them by the United States Constitution. 4 In
response, the county clerk, who was the defendant in the suit, filed a
motion to dismiss.5 Following the motion to dismiss, the court established a briefing schedule. 5 6 Although the clerk filed his brief in accordance with the schedule, the plaintiffs failed to file an answering
brief. 57 The court declined to speculate on the petitioners' arguments
"in this relatively novel area of the law" and granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss.5 8
A year after Baker, the same issue arose in Kentucky. In Jones v.
Hallahan' 9 two women challenged the trial court's decision that they
were not entitled to have a marriage license issued to them and
claimed the Kentucky statutes relating to marriage were unconstitutional.6" Although the Kentucky statutes did not specifically prohibit
47. Id. at 185-86 (emphasis added).
48. Md at 186.
49. 1& at 187.
50. Id. (citing Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144 (1914)).
51. IcL at 187. "The Constitution does not require things which are different in
fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same." Id. at 187 n.4
(quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 540 (1942)).
52. Id at 187.
53. 54 F.R.D. 626 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
54. Id.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
Id. at 589.
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marriage between persons of the same sex, neither did they authorize
a marriage license to be issued to same-sex couples.6 '
In a three-page opinion, the Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected
the petitioner's contention that the statutes violated their fundamental
right to marry. 62 The court determined that since the marriage statutes in question did not define marriage, the term must be defined
according to common usage. 63 The court quoted Webster's New International Dictionary, Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia, and
Black's Law Dictionary in determining that "marriage has always
been considered as the union of a man and a woman.... "I Thus, the
court stated, "It appears to us that-[petitioners] are prevented from
marrying, not by the statutes of Kentucky or the refusal of the [court
clerk] to issue them a license, but rather by their own incapability of
entering into a marriage as that term is defined."'65 Consequently, the
Jones court held same-sex couples cannot obtain a marriage license in
Kentucky because "what they propose is not a marriage."66
Less than a year after Jones, in Singer v. Hara,6 7 two men appealed
a decision denying their motion to compel a Washington county auditor to issue them a marriage license. 68 In Singer, the petitioners contended the trial court erred in concluding the state statute prohibited
same-sex marriages, and further, the court's order violated petitioners' rights under the Equal Rights Amendment to the Washington
Constitution 69 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 7° First, the petitioners argued the language of the marriage statute could be read to validate same-sex marriages. 7 ' The
court noted that although the statute previously authorized marriages
between males and females, it was amended in 1970 to authorize
"marriages by 'persons of the age of eighteen years, who are otherwise
capable.'" 72 However, the Singer court determined this change was
merely to implement the state legislature's elimination of different age
requirements between the sexes for marriage.73 Further, another
Washington statute relating to the issuance of marriage licenses
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. Marriageis defined as "the legal status, condition, or relation of one man
and one woman united in law for life, or until divorced .. .whose association is
founded on the distinction of sex." BLACK'S LAW DIMcrONARY 972 (6th ed. 1990)
(emphasis added).
65. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973).
66. Id. at 590.
67. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
68. Id. at 1188.
69. WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1.
70. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1188-89.
71. Id. at 1189.
72. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting the relevant Washington statute RCW 26.04.010
as amended in 1970).
73. Id.
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clearly made reference to the male and the female, thus dispelling "any
suggestion that the legislature intended to authorize same-sex
marriages." 74
Next, petitioners argued that if state marriage laws prohibited
same-sex unions, such laws were unconstitutional as applied. 75 They
relied on the United States Supreme Court decision in Loving v. Virginia,76 arguing the statutes violated the Washington Equal Rights
Act. 7 In Loving, the Supreme Court determined a statute that discriminated equally against blacks and whites was nonetheless based
upon unconstitutional racial classifications. 71 Thus, the Singer petitioners contended that permitting a man to marry a woman while denying him the right to marry another man was an unconstitutional
classification based on sex, even though it discriminated equally
against the sexes.7 9
The Washington Court of Appeals rejected this analogy, stating:
"The operative distinction lies in the relationship which is described
by the term 'marriage' itself, and that relationship is the legal union of
one man and one woman. ' 80 Thus, unlike the statute in Loving, which
barred individuals from entering an otherwise valid marriage based on
race, the Singer court found the Washington statute did not impinge
on the petitioners' constitutional rights to marry because marriage, as
a legal relationship, only exists between a man and a woman. 81
Last, petitioners argued the state's failure to grant them a marriage
license violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 82 The court, however,
determined that the Washington marriage statutes were presumed
constitutional, and thus, excluding same-sex relationships from the
definition of marriage did not violate the Equal Protection Clause if
the state had a reasonable basis for the exclusion.83 The court
concluded:
For constitutional purposes, it is enough to recognize that marriage
as now defined is deeply rooted in our society.... [M]arriage is so
clearly related to the public interest in affording a favorable environment for the growth of children that we are unable to say that
there is not a rational basis upon which the state may limit the pro74.
75.
76.
77.

Id
Id at 1189-90.
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Singer, 522 P.2d at 1190.

78. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8-9.

79. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1190.
80. Id at 1191.
81. Id
82. Id at 1195.
83. Id Although the Washington Supreme Court requires legislative classifications based on sex to be subject to strict scrutiny, this standard did not apply in Singer
since the court held the statute did not constitute sexual discrimination. Id. at 1196.
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its marriage laws to the legal union of one man and one
tection of
84

woman.

Thus, the Singer court held a rational basis existed for the statutes,
and the petitioners properly were denied a marriage license.85
Eight years passed before another same-sex controversy was reported. In Adams v. Howerton,86 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held a same-sex "marriage" did not qualify an alien as a Colorado
citizen's spouse.87 In Adams, following the expiration of a male
alien's visa, the alien and a Colorado man obtained a marriage license
from a county clerk in Colorado and were "married" by a minister. 8
The citizen then petitioned the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") to classify the male alien as an immediate relative of an
American citizen based upon the purported marriage.8 9 The petition
was denied, and the couple filed suit to challenge the final administrative decision.9'
The Adams court used a two-prong test to determine whether a
marriage will be recognized for immigration purposes: 1) whether the
marriage is valid under state law; and 2) whether the state-approved
marriage qualifies under the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952.91 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals avoided the question of
whether Colorado would recognize same-sex marriages by finding
that the INS interpreted the term spouse to exclude a person entering
a same-sex marriage. 2 Consequently, the petitioners failed the second half of the two-prong test.
Notwithstanding this finding, the petitioners claimed Congress' law
recognizing only unions between men and women violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it discriminated on the bases of sex and
homosexuality.93 Nevertheless, the Adams court found "Congress has
almost plenary power to admit or exclude aliens."94 As a result,
where there is a rational basis for a Congressional immigration law,
the act will be upheld.95 The court determined Congress' Act was
based on a concern for family integrity. 96 Consequently, Congress'
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 1197.
Id.
673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1041.

88. Id at 1038.

89. Id.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id
Id.
Id. at 1039-41.
Id. at 1041.
Id.
Id. at 1042.
Id. The Adams court also speculated that Congress' preference for recogniz-

ing only heterosexual unions might also be because "homosexual marriages never
produce offspring, because they are not recognized in most, if in any, of the states, or
because they violate traditional and often prevailing societal mores." Id. at 1042-43.
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decision to confer spousal status only to opposite-sex unions had a
rational basis, and "therefore comports97with the due process clause
and its equal protection requirements.
In 1984, De Santo v. Barnsley9" offered the Pennsylvania Superior
Court an opportunity to view another aspect of same-sex unions: divorce. In De Santo, the appellant filed a complaint for divorce and
asked for equitable distribution of property, alimony, and costs, alleging he and appellee had entered a common law marriage in 1970. 9
Appellee, however, denied he and appellant were ever married or capable of being married.' The trial court entered a decree dismissing
the appellant's complaint, accompanied by an opinion which held two
people of the same sex cannot, as a matter of law, enter a common law
marriage.' 0
The appellant argued the trial court erred in holding two people of
the same sex cannot have a common law marriage, and that to deny
10 2
this marriage violated the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment.
Noting that same-sex common law marriage was a case of first impression, the De Santo court found Pennsylvania marriage law did not specifically state common law or statutory marriage is limited to two
people of the opposite sex.' 0 3 "Nevertheless, the inference that mar' 4
riage is . . . limited [to persons of the opposite sex] is strong."'
Based upon the history of common law marriage and the commonly
understood definition of the term marriage, the court concluded a
common law marriage is a "relationship that can be established only
between two persons of opposite sex." 10
Eight years after De Santo, Dean v. Districtof Columbia'016 returned
the focus to statutory challenges of opposite-sex marriage laws. In
Dean, two homosexual males claimed the District of Columbia's Marriage Act violated their rights to due process and equal protection
under the law, and further violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.10 7 The petitioners began with the premise that the right
to marry is a fundamental liberty interest, and barring their union
under the Marriage Act resulted in an unconstitutional infringement
The D.C. Superior Court, however, determined the
of that right.'
correct inquiry was not whether the petitioners had "an abstract 'right
97. Id. at 1042.
98. 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).

99. Id. at 952.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 953 (citing PA. CONST. art. I, § 28).

103. Id. at 953-54.
104. Id. at 954.
105. Id.

106. No. CIV.A.90-13892, 1992 WL 685364 (D.C. Super. June 2, 1992) (mem.) affd
per curiam, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995).
107. Id. at *1.
108. Id.
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to marry,' but rather, whether the Constitution confers a fundamental
right upon persons of the same sex to marry one another." °9 The
Dean court referred to the traditional tests for determining whether a
liberty interest exists, as set forth in Bowers v. Hardwick."'
The Dean court first examined whether the right to same-sex marriage is "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither
liberty nor justice would exist if... sacrificed,"""' and if not, whether
it is a right "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 112
The D.C. Superior Court determined that since no state in this country has ever recognized same-sex marriages, it could not "seriously be
contended that the right to enter into such a union is 'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition."' 1 13 Further, the court found that
throughout history, society has viewed marriage as a union between
one man and one woman." 4 Consequently, the court held same-sex
marriage is 5 not a fundamental right qualifying for heightened
protection."
Regarding the petitioners' equal protection claim, the Dean court
found homosexuals are not a suspect class qualifying for heightened
protection."16 The Dean court restated its conclusion from an earlier
opinion:
[I]t simply is inaccurate to say that plaintiffs were denied a marriage
license due to their "sexual orientation" .... Rather, plaintiffs were
denied a marriage license due to the nature of marriage itself, requiring, as it does, that the parties thereto be a male and a female.
What the plaintiffs herein sought a license to enter into, by definition, simply was not a "marriage." Thus, plaintiffs' "class" or "status" is irrelevant and their equal protection claim illusory." 7
Moreover, the court stated even if the denial of a marriage license
was based on the petitioners' sexual orientation, the relevant inquiry
would be whether the prohibition against same-sex marriages was rationally related to a legitimate state interest.1 8 The court found the
restriction was rationally related to several interests, "each of which is
109. Id.
110. 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986).
111. Dean, 1992 WL 685364 at *1 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
112. Id (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
113. Id. at *2.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id at *3. "[Tihe Supreme Court to date has recognized only three classifications as 'suspect': race, alienage, and national origin: and two others as 'quasi-suspect':
gender and illegitimacy." Id. (footnotes omitted). Classes which are determined to be
suspect receive greater protection; any restriction on them must be justified by a compelling state interest, narrowly tailored to accomplish the means. See, e.g., Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
117. Dean, 1992 WL 685364 at *2 (citation omitted).
118. Id. at *4.
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529

not only legitimate but compelling.""' 9 Further, the court determined
these same interests were secular purposes for the statute and thus the
prohibition against same-sex marriage did not violate the Establishment Clause, even if it was based in part on religious convictions. 2 °
The Dean court set forth the following state interests as reasons to bar
same-sex unions:
(a) to foster, encourage and prevent any impediment to sociallyacceptable procreation; (b) to avoid taking any action which would
denote societal approval, condonation or encouragement of the sexual practice (i.e. sodomy) so intimately associated with homosexuality as to "define the class" . . . and (c) to protect the sacred

institution of marriage from such a radical transformation and redefinition that its very "consummation" by the marital partners
would be biologically impossible and the anticipated sexual intimacies of said
partners immoral and, under the current state of the law,
21
illegal.'

Thus, the court concluded it was permissible for the Marriage Act to
restrict marriage to only opposite-sex unions. Two and one-half years
122
later, the Dean decision was upheld by the D.C. Court of Appeals.
II.

WILL TEXAS RECOGNIZE SAME-SEX MARRIAGES VALIDLY
CONTRACTED IN ANOTHER STATE?

It is a well-established principle in American jurisprudence that the
ability to impose restrictions on marriage is within the police power of
the state. 123 It is equally well-accepted that the state's power to regulate the marital relationship is not absolute. 24 Thus, although Texas
has the authority to dictate which marriages will be valid within its
state lines, it must do so within federal constitutional constraints.
It is within this construct that the controversy at the heart of this
comment becomes apparent. Proponents of same-sex marriages argue
that since the right to marry is a fundamental right, homosexuals may
not be barred from marrying the person of their choice, even where
that person is of the same sex. Conversely, opponents argue that
although marriage is a fundamental right, it is within the sovereign
power of the state to define what constitutes a valid marriage. Thus, if
the state dictates that marriages may only occur between one man and
one woman, homosexuals cannot meet that definition and thus have
no right to marry someone of the same sex.
119. Id.
120. Id at *8.
121. Id
122. 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995) (per curiam).
123. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967).

124. Id. "[Miarriage is a social relation subject to the State's police power," but that
power must yield to constitutional restrictions. Id.
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The Supreme Court has spoken to this controversy, although its final word is, as usual, subject to different interpretations. First,
although the United States Supreme Court has determined the right
to marry is a fundamental right, 125 it also has made clear that this right
does not allow an individual to marry the person of his or her choice
without restriction. "Marriages not polygamous or incestuous, or
otherwise declared void by statute, will, if valid by the law of the state
where entered into, be recognized as valid in every other jurisdiction.' 1 26 Thus, a state may pronounce by statute that a specific union
is void. Assuming this statutory restriction is not constitutionally infirm, the state may declare a marriage to be void against public policy
in that state, even though it was validly contracted in
and thus invalid
1 27
another state.
For example, suppose two Texas men travel to Hawaii and marry
pursuant to the laws of that state. 28 They return to Texas to live, and
one dies intestate after six months. The decedent's "spouse" sues to
inherit under Texas laws of descent and distribution. 29 To determine
whether the survivor will inherit, the court must first resolve whether
the couple was validly married. If they were not married, the laws of
descent and distribution dictate the decedent's next of kin inherit and
the survivor take nothing. 3 ° If, however, a valid marriage is recognized, the same-sex spouse will inherit all or a portion of the decedent's real and personal property, just as any other surviving spouse.
Thus, it is critical for the survivor to demonstrate that he is a surviving
spouse.
This presents a classic conflict of law problem. Must the Texas court
apply Hawaii law to determine if the marriage is valid (in which case it
will be), or may it apply Texas law (in which case the marriage may or
may not be valid, depending on the local law of the state)? This is a
question Texas judges may have to answer before the conclusion of
1996, but a lack of proper guidance in choice of law issues may hinder
the decision-making process and result in inconsistent findings.

125. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495
(1965) (marriage is part of the fundamental right to privacy guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
126. Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1934) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
127. Id. at 224.
128. This example and the remainder of this comment assume that the state of Hawaii will fail to come forward with a compelling state interest in the Baehr case, and
consequently, same-sex marriages will become legal in Hawaii.
129. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 38(b)(2) (West 1980) (spouse of intestate decedent
inherits all real and personal property of the decedent if there are no children of the
decedent who were not also the children of the surviving spouse).
130. Id. § 38(a).
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The Most Significant Relationship Test

Texas historically followed the rule that the state of the marriage
celebration determines whether a marriage is valid unless the marriage is contrary to strong public policy. "Traditionally, [Texas] courts
have chosen and used the law of the place a divorce or marriage purportedly occurs to determine the validity of the ceremony.' 1 31 However, in a 1984 wrongful death action, the Texas Supreme Court
discarded this traditional lex loci 132 test and replaced it with the most
significant relationship test to determine choice of law issues. In
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co. ,133 the court held:
[U]se of the most significant relationship approach in accordance
with the general principles stated in § 6 [of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws] produces reasoned choice of law decisions
grounded in those specific governmental policies relevant to the
particular substantive issue. Consequently, the lex loci rules will no
longer be used in this state to resolve conflicts problems. Instead, in
all choice of law cases, except those contract cases in which the parties have agreed to a valid choice of law clause, the law of the state
with the most significant relationship to the
particular substantive
1 34
issue will be applied to resolve that issue.
Thus, the plain language of Duncan seems to indicate that in a validity
of marriage issue involving choice of law, the law of the state with the
most significant relationship to the marriage and the couple should be
applied. The state with the most significant relationship is determined
by considering the following factors set forth in section six of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, as adopted by the Texas
Supreme Court:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied. 3 5
As stated in comment (c) to section six, "[l]egislatures usually legislate, and courts usually adjudicate, only with the local situation in
mind. They rarely give thought to the extent to which the laws they
131. Seth v. Seth, 694 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ); see

also Portwood v. Portwood, 109 S.W.2d 515, 521-22 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1937,
writ dism'd).
132. Lex loci means "[tihe law of the place."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

ed. 1990).
133. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
134. Id. at 421 (second emphasis added).
135.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

911 (6th

§ 6 (1971).

17

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 2 [2022], Iss. 3, Art. 5

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

enact, and the common law rules they enunciate, should apply to outof-state facts."' 3 6 As the comment suggests, some of the factors may
point to a different result,
thus section six is a rule of "accommodation
1 37
of conflicting values.'
For example, in a suit to recognize the validity of same-sex marriages, the most likely pertinent factors from above are: (b) the relevant policies of Texas, the forum state; (c) the relevant policies of the
state inwhich the same-sex couple validly married and the relevant
interests of that state in determining whether the marriage is recognized in Texas; (d) protection of justified expectations; (e) the basic
policies relevant to marriage; and (f) the certainty, predictability, and
uniformity of the outcome.' 38
Certainly, each of these factors will be critical in determining a marriage's validity. Consequently, it is important to remember that the
significance of each factor may vary from case to case and should be
evaluated independently. It is also important to keep in mind that the
most significant relationship test does not merely pit Texas public policy against Hawaii public policy (and the public policy of all other interested states). Rather, section six mandates that each factor must be
considered and the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the marriage and the couple - based on all of these factors,
not merely the strongest one - must be applied.' 39 For example,
even if the state of Hawaii had a very strong interest in validating a
couple's marriage, Texas law may still apply if several other factors
together outweigh Hawaii's interest, even though one of these factors
alone may not be strong enough to outweigh Hawaii's interest.
Further,
[I]n order for a jurisdiction to have an "interest" in having its law
applied it is necessary that the purpose behind the law be furthered
by that application. Mere contact with a state is not enough; there
must also be a functional relationship between the contact and the
legal issue to be resolved. 4 °
Since the adoption of section six in 1984, the Texas Supreme Court
has yet to hear a validity of marriage case. As a result, it is unclear
how application of this section will affect same-sex marriage cases.
Nevertheless, two appellate courts have decided related issues. Examination of these cases may thus be helpful in ascertaining the issues to
be resolved in the application of section six to same-sex marriages validly contracted in other states.
136. Id. § 6 cmt. c.
137. Id.
138. Id. § 6.
139. WILLIAM
FLICT OF LAWS §

M.

RICHMAN

& WILLIAM L.

REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING

CON-

70[c]-[d] (2d ed. 1993).
140. Id. § 70[c](i).
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In Seth v. Seth, 4 ' a Moslem man's purported wife ("Wife TWo")
sued him for divorce, claiming the husband had validly divorced his
first wife ("Wife One") in accord with the Islamic talak by announcing
three times "I divorce you."' 42 The second wife alleged they were
married the day after the purported divorce in another Moslem ceremony.' 43 The first wife, however, argued her husband converted to
the Islamic religion solely to divorce her through the talak, and under
such circumstances,
the conversion and hence the divorce were
14 4
invalid.

The Fort Worth Court of Appeals noted that although Texas courts
traditionally used the law of the place where a marriage or divorce
occurred to determine whether the ceremony was valid, two Texas
Supreme Court decisions recently changed that rule. 45
[C]hoice-of-law decisions should not be made on the basis of the
mechanical test of where the act occurred (lex loci) but should instead be made on the basis of the most significant relationship approach, using the factors set forth in the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS sec. 6 ....Thus.... we

hold that sec. 6 criteria, and not the place of celebration test, should
be applied to determine choice of law in a marriage or divorce
context.' 46
The Seth court determined the most important consideration in
light of the circumstances was (b), the relevant policies of the forum.1 47 Although the marriage and divorce ceremonies did not take

place in Texas, and the husband and second wife were citizens of India, Texas still had a substantial nexus to the lawsuit. 4 8 "[The] Husband and Wife Two have lived [in Texas] since 1977, during which
time they acquired real property within the State. That connection
would enhance the prerogative of the trial court to consider the relevant policies
of Texas in deciding the present conflicts of law
1 49
question."'

The court next considered the policy in question, and determined
that allowing a husband to divorce his non-Moslem wife by repeating
a short phrase three times was unduly harsh and contrary to "good
morals and natural justice."' 5 ° Further, the court decided no other
141. 694 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).

142. Id at 461.
143. Id
144. Id at 463.
145. Id. at 462 (citing Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 420-21 (Tex.
1984) and Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. 1979)).
146. Id (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
147. Id at 463.
148. Id
149. Id
150. Id. at 463.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

19

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 2 [2022], Iss. 3, Art. 5

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

151
section six factors outweighed factor (b).
"Because the facts of this
case are so unusual, it hardly seems likely that the needs of the international systems will be implicated by it.... [I]n regards to factor d,
the jury found that Wife Two did not in good faith believe that Hus1 52
band had divorced Wife One, or that she was married to Husband.'
Accordingly, the Seth court found Texas law applied
and upheld the
53
trial court's decision in favor of the first wife.
Five months later, the San Antonio Court of Appeals faced a similar situation. In Ossorio v. Leon, 5 4 a Mexican widow challenged a
summary judgment which operated to deny her one-half of the funds
on deposit in a Texas bank. 155 Years before her husband's death, the
petitioner and her husband deposited funds in the Laredo International Bank of Commerce as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. 156 After the husband's death, the widow's attempt to withdraw
the funds was circumvented by the husband's two children from a previous marriage, who claimed they were entitled to one-half of the
funds under Texas' descent and distribution laws.' 57 The trial court
held Texas law applied and thus granted the children's summary
judgment. 5 s
On appeal, the San Antonio court determined ownership of the deposits depended on whether the decedent made a valid gift of the deposits to his spouse.' 59 If Texas law applied, the gift was invalid
regardless of the intent of the donor, and the decedent's children
owned one-half of the funds on deposit. 6 ° On the other hand, if Mexico law applied, the gift was valid at the death of the donor spouse,
and the petitioner owned the entire sum.' 6 ' Although the appellees
argued Texas law should govern since the contract of deposit was
made there, the San Antonio Court of Appeals relied on the rule from
Duncan to hold that the most significant relationship test applied. 162
The Leon court set forth the factors of the test and first found reso163
lution of this matter would have no effect on Texas or its citizens.

151. Id. The Seth court pitted each factor individually against factor (b), and concluded "[n]or do we see how any of the other sec. 6 factors might outweigh factor b."
Id. at 463 (emphasis added). This appears to be an improper application of the factors
in Restatement (Second) section six. As discussed above, the factors set forth in this
section are to be applied in a balancing test, rather than individually comparing one
factor against another.
152. Id. at 463-64.
153. Id.
154. 705 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
155. Id. at 221.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 222.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 223.
163. Id.
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Second, the Laredo bank had no interest in the lawsuit because it
would be required to pay out the same funds regardless of which party
prevailed." 6 Third, decedent and petitioner were citizens of Mexico
and resided in Mexico during their forty-two year marriage. 165 Further, none of the certificates of deposit in controversy were paid for
with funds earned in Texas." 6 Last, the Leon court determined the
decedent and his wife had justified expectations that deserved to be
protected. 167 Consequently, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held
Mexico had the most significant relationship regarding the issue of
ownership;
thus the gift to the petitioner was valid under the laws of
168
Mexico.
B. The Most Significant Relationship Test Causes Uncertainty When
Applied Alone in Validity of Marriage Cases
Based on these appellate cases, it appears likely courts will apply
section six to determine the validity of marriages contracted in other
jurisdictions. However, it is important to note that the Duncan court
did not adopt the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws in its
entirety, nor has the Texas Supreme Court or Texas Legislature subsequently done so. Rather, the Texas Supreme Court has adopted other
sections of the Restatement (Second) in piecemeal fashion. 16 9 This
omission leaves numerous questions regarding the application of section six where same-sex couples marry in Hawaii and subsequently
move to Texas. Thus, although the Duncan court believed the most
significant relationship test will produce more reasoned results in
choice of law issues, 7 ° it may do so at the expense of certainty. Because of this uncertainty, it is debatable which same-sex marriages, if
any, Texas must recognize under the most significant relationship test.
Although it is clear that under Duncan, the local law of the state with
the most significant relationship regarding a particular issue applies in
the case of same-sex marriages, 17 applying Restatement (Second)
section six to these cases without other guidance will be problematic.
164. Id.

165. Id. at 222.
166.
167.
168.
169.
TECH

Id.
Id. at 223.
Id.
See James P. George, Choice of Law: A Guide for Texas Attorneys, 25 TEX.
L. REV. 833, 844 (1994). See, e.g., DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d

670, 680-81 (Tex. 1990) (adopting § 187), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048 (1991).
170. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984).
171. For example, although the particular issue may involve probate, before this
action can be settled the validity of the marriage must be determined. As a result, the

"particular issue" to be decided at the outset will be the validity of the marriage. See
§ 283 cmt. a (1971) ("a decision of
questions involving the incidents of a marriage should be preceded by a determination of the validity of the marriage").
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
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1. Failure to Address Strong Public Policy
First, the rule does not account for instances where the marriage
violates the strong public policy of the state with the most significant
relationship. In other areas of the law, the Texas Supreme Court has
addressed the strong public policy issue. For example, in DeSantis v.
Wackenhut Corp.,172 the court struck down a non-competition agreement which violated Texas public policy.' 73 Notwithstanding the parties' agreement that Florida law should govern interpretation and
enforcement of the contract, the court looked to section 187 of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law, Law of the State Chosen
by the Parties, to determine which law to apply. 174 Section 187(2)(b)
states:
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied ... unless...
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary
to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater
interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue ....
175
The DeSantis court determined unreasonable covenants not to compete are in contravention of Texas public policy. As a result, the court
held "the law governing enforcement of non-competition agreements
is fundamental policy in Texas, and . . . to apply the law of another
state to determine the enforceability of such an agreement... would
be contrary to that policy.' 76 Notwithstanding the Duncan rule, the
Texas Supreme Court held the parties' agreement that another state's
law would govern was not sufficient to overcome strong Texas public
policy. 177 As a result, the enforceability of the agreement
was to be
1 78
determined by Texas law rather than Florida law.
Regarding same-sex marriages, opponents of these unions may advocate the adoption of a similar rule. Thus, if such marriages violate
the strong public policy of the state, recognition of the union would be
precluded even though no statute or case law prohibits such marriages. However, no such rule currently exists in Texas. Consequently, under Duncan, in the event of a same-sex marriage, if Texas
has the most significant relationship to the couple but does not have a
state law prohibiting same-sex marriages, it appears the marriage
would be valid notwithstanding strong Texas public policy to the
contrary.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

793 S.W.2d. 670 (Tex. 1990).
Id. at 679.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcr OF LAWS

§ 187 (1971).

Id. § 187(2)(b).
DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 681.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 674.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol2/iss3/5
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V2.I3.4

22

King: Ya'll Cain't Do That Here: Will Texas Recognize Same-Sex Marriage

1996]

SAME-SEX MARRIAGES

2. Time of the Test
The second problem is that application of section six to validity of
marriage cases may lead to inconsistent results in different courts. In
addition to not providing a public policy exception, section six does
not address when the most significant relationship should be applied
in a choice of law issue.' 79 This distinction may be critical to the out-

come of a case. For example, suppose two people of the same sex
reside in Hawaii and marry there pursuant to a valid Hawaii marriage
statute. One of the partners subsequently obtains a job in Texas, and
the couple moves to Dallas one year after their marriage. The employer, however, refuses to extend its health care program benefits to
the spouse of the employee, claiming Texas does not recognize samesex marriages. When the couple sues to compel the employer to give
them the same benefits as other married couples, the most significant
relationship test is applied to determine if a valid marriage exists. After determining which state has the most significant relationship, the
court applies that state's local law. However, is the proper question:
1) which state had the most significant relationship to the couple at the
time of their marriage,or 2) which state had the most significant relationship to the couple at the time of the suit? Although in Seth v. Seth,
the Fort Worth Court of Appeals appears to have applied the most
significant relationship test at the time of the suit, 8 ° this is not binding
throughout Texas. Further, in Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,"8 the
Texas Supreme Court left open the question of whether the test applies at the time of suit or at the time of the event at issue.
Referring to the example above, it is likely that at the time of the
marriage, Hawaii is the state with the most significant relationship. In
this case, the local law of Hawaii should determine the validity of the
marriage. Since the marriage is in accord with Hawaii law, it will be
upheld. However, after the couple moves to Texas, Hawaii's interest
in the couple's marriage presumably lessens. Consequently, at the
time of the suit, arguably Texas has the most significant relationship.
In this case, the local law of Texas will determine the validity of the
marriage. Depending on whether Texas law prohibits same-sex unions, the marriage may be declared invalid. Thus, the outcome of two
cases brought at the same time, involving similar facts, will likely turn
on whether the most significant relationship test is applied at the time
of the marriage or at the time of the suit. Therefore, using only section six of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to determine
the validity of a marriage contracted in another state may lead to inconsistent results in Texas courts.
179. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
180. Seth v. Seth, 694 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
181. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
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The answer, then, is to clarify application of this section to validity
of marriage cases judicially or in the next legislative session. This
could be accomplished by stating that in regard to validation of marriages, the most significant relationship test must be applied at the
time of suit involving the particular issue. Conversely, the courts or
the Texas Legislature may wish to take this test a step further.
As mentioned previously, the Texas Supreme Court has adopted
pertinent sections of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws as
it has deemed necessary. To clarify how section six will affect validity
of marriage cases, the Texas Supreme Court or the Texas Legislature
should consider modifying and adopting section 283. Section 283, entitled Validity of Marriage, currently states:
(1) The validity of a marriage will be determined by the local law of
the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage under the
principles stated in § 6.
(2) A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where
the marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid
unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which had
the most significant relationship
to the spouses and the marriage at
1 82
the time of the marriage.

Under subsection (1), courts are referred to Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws section six to determine the state with the most
significant relationship. 183 This subsection merely makes it clear that
courts are not bound to decide all issues under the local law of the
same state. As comment (d) to subsection (1) explains, "Each issue is
to receive separate consideration [under section six] if it is one which
would be resolved differently under the local law rule of two or more
of the potentially interested states."'" For example, in a case involving the validity of a marriage, a court may apply its own state's rules to
issues involving procedural aspects, and may decide other issues, such
as capacity of the parties to marry, by reference to the law of the state
with the most significant relationship. Thus, the most significant relationship test must be applied as it relates with respect to the particular
85

issue.1

182. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1971) (emphasis added). It should be noted that subsection (2) restates the lex loci test with regard to
marriage; that is, a marriage valid where contracted is valid everywhere unless contrary to some strong public policy of the state. Under Duncan, however, the Texas
Supreme Court expressly rejects use of the lex loci test for any choice of law issue. It
will be interesting to see if the court backpeddles and adopts this portion of the Restatement to deal with validity of marriage issues, especially when adoption of this
section might make it more difficult for the court to refuse to recognize same-sex
marriages.
183. Id.
184. Id. § 283(1) cmt. d.

185. Id.
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However, to clarify the issue of when the most significant relationship test should apply, the Texas Legislature should consider adopting
subsection one with the following change: "The validity of a marriage
will be determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to
the particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the
spouses and the marriage at the time of the suit under the principles
stated in § 6." This is supported by the rationale set forth in comment
(2)(k), which explains how the time of bringing the action is relevant. 1 86 Specifically, the comment states:
If the action is brought at a time when both spouses are still domiciled in that state, the interest of that state in the spouses is apparent and its strong policy may be involved ....The situation may
well be different, however, if the action involving the validity of the
marriage is brought at a time when both of the spouses have moved
from the state.... [I]t is probable that the forum would find that by
reason of the removal of the spouses the state no longer had a sufficient interest 1in87the application of its rule to warrant invalidation of
the marriage.
The necessity for this express provision is further emphasized when
looking at section 283(2). Subsection two applies the most significant
relationship test at the time of the marriage. Although subsection one
does not state the most significant relationship test should be applied
at the time of marriage, the language in subsection two may be read in
conjunction with subsection one to create this presumption. Moreover, if the Texas Legislature adopts section 283(2), it should consider
eliminating the words at the time of the marriage to prevent conflict
with subsection one. On the other hand, the Legislature may expressly provide that section 283(1) should also apply the most significant relationship test at the time of the marriage. Although this
disregards the rationale that the interest of the state with the most
significant relationship at the time of the marriage generally diminishes after the couple moves to another state and brings suit, it is imperative that subsections one and two are consistent to provide
certainty in these decisions.
It is important to note that adoption of subsection two of section
283 may render a significantly different result in Texas courts than the
most significant relationship test standing alone, particularly in regard
to same-sex marriages. Under section six, the law of the state with the
most significant relationship to the issue governs; thus if the Texas
186. Id § 283(2) cmt. k.
187. Id Based on this comment, it is logical to assume that when a couple moves
from Hawaii to Texas and sues for recognition of the marriage, Hawaii's policies and
relevant interests in validating the marriage diminish to some extent, if not entirely,
while Texas' interests increase. Conversely, if the Hawaiian couple moved to Texas
and one of the spouses died intestate with his spouse as his only surviving heir, Hawaii
may have a strong interest if all of the real property is located in Hawaii, notwithstanding the fact that the couple has moved from the state.
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Supreme Court determines the language of the Texas Family Code
sets forth an implicit prohibition against same-sex marriages, 188 Hawail marriages would be void in Texas. Section 283, on the other
hand, states the general lex loci test for determining if a marriage is
valid. Thus, if a marriage is valid where contracted, it is presumed
valid everywhere

-

including Texas

-

unless it is against a strong

public policy of the state with the most significant relationship. Therefore, if Texas adopts section 283, even if the state has a law which
prohibits issuance of a marriage license to two individuals of the same
sex, that local law is not necessarily sufficient to cause the forum to
invalidate the marriage.
Comment (k) to section 283 gives an example of the application of
this section:
The fact that the marriage was incestuous under the local law of the
state of most significant relationship would not of itself be enough
to cause the forum to invalidate the marriage. In the absence of
explicit statute or judicial precedent to the contrary in the state of
the most significant relationship, the forum would be unlikely to
find that a rule against incest represented a sufficiently strong policy
to warrant invalidation of the marriage except where the persons
involved were in so close a relationship as brother and sister and
perhaps uncle and niece.' 89
Thus, if Texas adopts this section and does not have an express statute or judicial precedent that invalidates same-sex marriages, Texas
will likely have to recognize the marriage, unless it can show such
marriage is contrary to strong state policy. On the other hand, opponents of same-sex marriages who do not believe Texas statutes or judicial precedents expressly void same-sex marriages, and who fear Texas
will not otherwise provide for a public policy exception, may advocate
adoption of this section. In this manner, notwithstanding a lack of
case law or express statute, opponents may argue that same-sex marriages violate a strong public policy of Texas and thus the marriages
are void. Comment (k) explains application of section 283(2) in
detail:
In determining whether the courts of the state of most significant
relationship would have invalidated the marriage the forum will first
consult the statutes of that state. Some states have statutes which
invalidate in specified circumstances the out-of-state marriage of local domiciliaries. If the marriage comes within the provisions of
such a statute, it is clear that it would be held invalid in the state of
the most significant relationship .... If the state of most significant
relationship has no such statute, the forum will next inquire whether
the marriage would be held invalid by the courts of that state by

188. See infra notes 193-218 and accompanying text.
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 283(2) cmt. k (1971) (em-

phasis added).
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application of their choice-of-law rules. If it can be determined
from the prior decisions of these courts that they would have held
the marriage invalid, the forum will do likewise .... [I]n the ab-

sence of explicit statute or judicial precedent in the state of most
significant relationship, the only rules that the forum would be
likely to find embody a sufficiently strong policy of that state to warrant invalidation of an out-of-state marriage are rules which prohibit polygamous marriages, certain incestuous
marriages, or the
190
marriage of minors below a certain age.
Under this section, if Texas does not have a strong public policy
prohibiting same-sex marriages, as determined by looking at express
statutory provisions, prior court decisions, or strong state policy, the
marriages are valid. Conversely, if Texas public policy strongly disfavors same-sex unions, the marriages will be invalid under 283(2) because they violate "the strong public policy of another state which had
the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage
"191

C. Application of the Most Significant Relationship to
Same-Sex Marriages
Based on the most significant relationship test discussed above, will
Texas recognize same-sex marriages contracted in other states? To
answer this question, it is helpful to look at the history of same-sex
marriage in Texas and to determine 1) whether Texas has an express
statute which would invalidate same-sex marriages under Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws section six; 2) whether Texas judicial
precedents will invalidate same-sex marriages under Restatement
(Second) section six; and 3) Texas public policy regarding marriage,
particularly whether the policy is sufficiently strong to invalidate a
same-sex marriage under Restatement (Second) section 283(2).
1. Texas Statutes
Unlike several
Texas does not have an express provision
stating that same-sex marriages contracted in other jurisdictions will
nevertheless be invalid within the state. The Texas marriage license
statute comes closest to expressing a prohibition against same-sex
states, 192

marriages in Texas.' 9 3 Texas Family Code section 1.01 states: "A man
190.- I.(emphasis added).
191. Id § 283(2).
192. H.B. 503, 138th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (Del. 1995); IDAHO CODE § 32-209
(1996); H.B. 5662 (Public Act No. 334), 88th Leg., R.S. (Mich. 1996); S.B. 1487, 1996
R.S., 1996 N.C. Laws Ch. 588; H.B. 4502, 1996 R.S., 1996 S.C. Laws Act 327; S.B.
2305, 99th Gen. Assembly, 2d R.S. (Tenn. 1995).
193. Texas is also one of several states with a sodomy statute still in effect. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West 1994). Arguably, this statute strengthens the argument that no same-sex marriage can be valid in Texas, because this statute prohibits
the couple from consummating the marriage. This argument, however, ignores the
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and a woman desiring to enter into a ceremonial marriage shall obtain
a marriage license from the county clerk of any county of this state. A
license may not be issued for the marriage of persons of the same
sex."' 194 However, though this statute bars two people of the same sex
from marrying in Texas, it clearly does not address a situation where
two individuals marry outside of Texas and then enter the state.
Although it may be argued that the language in Texas Family Code
section 1.01,1'1 as well as other statutory directives, 96 evidence legislative intent to only recognize a marriage between a man and a woman, on its face this statute merely operates to prevent two
individuals of the same sex from procuring a marriage license. Further, since Texas recognizes common law marriage,' it may be argued that a license is not necessarily a prerequisite to entering the
state of marriage in Texas. 198
The Texas Government Code provides valuable instruction to
courts seeking to ascertain the meaning of a statute. Texas Government Code section 311.023 provides:
In construing a statute, whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous on its face, a court may consider among other matters the:
(1) object sought to be attained;
(2) circumstances under which the statute was enacted;
(3) legislative history;
(4) common law or former statutory provisions, including laws on
the same or similar subjects;
(5) consequences of a particular construction;
(6) administrative constitution of the statute; and
99
(7) title (caption), preamble, and emergency provision.'
Thus, it is helpful to look at each of these elements, and in particular the "object sought to be attained," the "circumstances under which
the statute was enacted," and the "legislative history" of section 1.01
of the Family Code to determine whether the Texas Legislature intended to merely prohibit same-sex couples from obtaining a marriage
license in the state or whether the Legislature intended to make samesex unions absolutely void in Texas.
probability that the couple have already consummated the union in the marriage
state. However, unlike the old law which required consummation of marriage, the
United States Supreme Court has stated that all marriages are presumed valid, unless
polygamous, incestuous, or in violation of some strong state policy, without mention
of consummation of marriage. Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1934).
194. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.01 (West 1993).

195. Id.

196. See, e.g., TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 38 (West 1980).
197. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.19 (West 1993).

198. Just as a same-sex couple may contest the statute which prohibits issuing a
marriage license to two members of the same sex, the couple may also challenge the
common law marriage statute as discriminatory.
199. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.023 (West 1988).
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In 1973, House Bill ("H.B.") 103 amended Texas Family Code Section 1.01 to clarify whether two individuals of the same sex could obtain a marriage license in Texas. Prior to the amendment, section 1.01
read: "Persons desiring to enter into a ceremonial marriage shall obtain a marriage license from the county clerk in any county of this
state. '200 Under this section, two men in Houston fraudulently obtained a marriage license. "On October 4, 1972, Mr. Antonio Molina
and Miss Billie Ert entered the courthouse at Wharton County, Texas,
for the purpose of obtaining a marriage license.... At the time Wil-

liam 'Billie' Ert applied for the license, he was wearing a minidress,
blonde wig, false eyelashes and facial makeup."20 1 After obtaining the
license, the couple was married in Houston, Texas, by the pastor of the
Metropolitan Community Church of Dallas, Texas.2
Notwithstanding the fraud, the couple presented the marriage license to the county clerk for registration.20 3 Based on Texas Family
Code section 2.01, which codified the presumption in favor of holding
a marriage contracted in Texas to be valid, the couple appeared to be
legally married.20 4 Section 2.01 states:
[I]n order to provide stability for those entering into the married
relationship in good faith and to provide for an orderly determination of parentage and security for the children of the relationship, it
is the policy of this state to preserve and uphold each marriage
against claims of invalidity unless strong reasons exist for holding it
void or voidable. Therefore, every marriage entered into in this
state is considered valid unless it is expressly made void by this chapter or unless it is expressly made voidable by this chapter and is an-

nulled as provided by this chapter....205
Since marriage between two persons of the same sex was not made
expressly void or voidable by the Family Code, the Texas Legislature
apparently determined the current statute did not go far enough to
prohibit same-sex marriages, even when such marriages were procured by deception. As a result, H.B. 103 was introduced by Representative Nabors to amend Family Code section 1.01 and prevent a
similar occurrence in the future. 0 6 The amendment proposed by
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.01 (West 1993) (emphasis added).
201. James W. Harper & George M. Clifton, Comment, Heterosexuality;A Prerequisite to Marriage in Texas?, 14 S. TEX. L.J. 220, 220 (1972-73) (citing HOUSTON

200. See

CHRONICLE,

Oct. 26, 1972, at 2, col. 4).

202. Id.
203. Id.

204. When the couple presented the marriage license to the county clerk for registration, the clerk refused to file it. The couple filed a motion for a mandamus to
compel the county clerk to record the executed marriage license. Their request was
denied and the marriage was later declared void.
205. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.01 (West Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
206. Act of 1973, H.B. 103, p. 1596, ch. 577, § 1, 63rd Leg., R.S. (Tex. 1973) (effec-

tive Jan. 1, 1974). ("amending Section 1.01, relating to the persons who may acquire a
marriage license"); see also HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUD., BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B.
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Representative Nabors changed the word "[plersons desiring to enter
into a ceremonial marriage... " to "[a] man and a woman desiring to
enter into a ceremonial marriage.... ,2o7 The reason stated in the bill

analysis for this change was "to require that the applicants for a marriage license be a man and a woman.

'2° a

Moreover, testimony

presented during a hearing of the Committee on the Judiciary further
clarifies the purpose of the bill.
During a public hearing held March 13, 1973, two students from
South Texas Law School were present to speak against the bill. The
students, George Clifton and James Harper, opposed the bill because
they did not believe it went far enough to accomplish the intent of the
20 9
Legislature to prevent what they termed "homosexual marriage.
Excerpted below are pertinent portions of their testimony:
George Clifton: We are for this bill as it is, but we are against the

means that are being used to try and accomplish what we think is
trying to be accomplished in this particular section, section 1.01.
Mr. Chairman, you brought it up yourself.., could two persons of
the same sex actually get married?... The section has been changed
to read "a man and a woman" instead of "persons." But we do not
feel that this particular wording will achieve the goal of preventing
two persons of the same sex from marrying in Texas.

The reasons that the bill will not eliminate further occurrences of
homosexual marriages in Texas ...may be briefly summarized as
follows ....

First of all, we feel that two persons of the same sex may still be
able to obtain a marriage license by fraud upon the county clerk if
one of them dresses as a female and signs the application in the
space provided for the female. If such event were to occur, then
under section 2.02 [sic], the validity of the marriage would not be
affected by such fraud and troublesome litigation would result.
Section 2.01 states that every marriage entered into in this state is
considered valid unless it is expressly made void by this chapter or
unless it is expressly made voidable by this chapter and is annulled
as provided by this chapter.... [N]owhere in the Code is it provided
that a homosexual marriage is void or voidable. The argument can
and has been made that under section 2.01 of the Texas Family
Code, a homosexual marriage is valid.
The bill [H.B. 103] says nothing concerning the validity of such a
marriage itself, but confines its language to the subject of procuring
a marriage license. It has been declared in Portwood v. Portwood,a
103, 63d Leg., R.S. (1973) ("Amends Sec. 1.01 to require that the applicants for a
marriage license be a man and a woman.").
207. Enrolled Tex. H.B. 103.
208. HousE COMM. ON THE JUD., BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 103, 63d Leg., R.S.
(1973).
209. Hearing on Tex. H.B. 103, Comm. on the Jud., 63d Leg., R.S. (Mar. 13, 1973)

(statement of James Harper, South Texas Law School student) (tapes on file with the
author).
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named case in this area, that mere irregularities in the application
for a marriage license or in the license itself would be immaterial in
the determination of the validity of a marriage performed in Texas.
The fraud implied by a male signing his name in the space provided for the woman's surname would certainly be no more fundamental an irregularity than fraudulent misrepresentations as to
information expressly called for by the Code. It has been held that
a false statement as to one's age when applying for a marriage license will not render a marriage void.
As a result, the fraud involved in procuring the marriage license
will not render a homosexual marriage invalid. These are the reasons that we disagree with this bill.21
James Harper, the second law student, offered a solution to the
problem.
James Harper:As Mr. Clifton stated, we feel like the main reason
for the change in the section 1.01 of the Family Code is to prevent a
reoccurrence of a homosexual marriage which we had in Houston
back in October [1972].... We respectively submit that a change as
recommended by Mr. Nabors to section 1.01 would fall short of
reaching the goal of preventing further homosexual marriages.
We would like to see a definition of marriage introduced into the
Family Code whereby it clearly states that no marriage shall be valid
within the meaning of this Code except that it be between a male
...

and a female ....

(A brief discussion followed regarding underage marriage, to
which the students also proposed an amendment.)
As Mr. Clifton has stated, we have no complaints whatsoever
with Representative Nabors' bill. We just feel like it does fall short
of the mark. Actually, we have no complaints with the Family Code
as it is now other than the fact we feel that a provision should definitely be made to avoid the embarrassment to the State of Texas
and the national publicity we received because of the recent Houston marriage. The comments were made that the red-faced Texas officials had to admit that the marriage was probably valid. As it
stands now.., the two people obtained a valid marriage license and
they got married with a great deal of publicity in Houston and they
went down to try and have the county clerk record the marriage.
He refused and presently there is a mandamus hearing pending to
force the county clerk to record the license. The Attorney General
of Texas, the late Crawford Martin, published an Attorney General's opinion stating that he felt like because of legislative intent
that no valid marriage could be entered by persons of the same sex.
But legislative intent is quite a two-edged sword and an extremely
strong argument can be made whereby ... the legislators didn't ex-

pressly rule out a homosexual marriage, they just never considered
a homosexual marriage. And our position is: Can you imply omis210. Id. (statement of George Clifton, South Texas Law School student) (emphasis
added).
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sion from exclusion? They just didn't think of it, they didn't exclude
it. So we feel like something definite ought to be stated within the
changes to the Family Code. 11
Based on the Legislature's approval of H.B. 103 to amend Family
Code section 1.01, and the legislative history of that amendment, it
appears clear that although the Legislature may never have considered the situation where a same-sex couple validly marries in another
state, it did intend to make same-sex marriages that are contracted in
Texas absolutely void. Under section 1.01, "[a] man and a woman desiring to enter into a ceremonial marriage shall obtain a marriage license from the county clerk of any county of this state. A license may
not be issued for the marriage of persons of the same sex." 212 Thus, to
procure a marriage license, two individuals of the same sex would
have to commit fraud upon the county clerk. Since section 1.01 now
prohibits issuance of a marriage license to couples of the same sex,
any same-sex Texas marriage contracted pursuant to a fraudulently
obtained marriage license is void under Family Code section 2.01.
The controversy in this area thus revolves around whether the
amendment to Family Code section 1.01 is sufficient to preclude recognition of same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions. Opponents
to same-sex marriage contend that this amendment has the effect of
making Family Code section 1.01 an express prohibition against samesex marriage. If this argument is accepted, it is likely that Texas will
not have to recognize same-sex unions under the most significant relationship test stated in Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section six, where Texas is the state with the most significant relationship
and the local law prohibits such marriages.
However, it should be noted that during the Committee on the Judiciary Hearing, James Harper, one of the testifying law students from
the South Texas College of Law, asked the Committee to adopt specific language to clarify the intent of the Texas Legislature: "[N]o marriage shall be valid within the meaning of this Code except that it be
between a male ...

and a female ....

213 Harper contended that

merely changing the language in Family Code section 1.01 to be gender-specific, that is, to change it from persons to a man and a woman,
was not sufficient to prevent a same-sex marriage from occurring
when considered in conjunction with Family Code section 2.01, which
validates any marriage not declared void by statute. 14 Moreover,
Harper stated, inclusion of the words man and woman, and husband
and wife in various Texas statutory provisions was insufficient to sup211. Id. (statement of James Harper) (emphasis added).
212. TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. §

1.01 (West 1993) (emphasis added).

213. Hearing on Tex. H.B. 103, Comm. on the Jud., 63d Leg., R.S. (Mar. 13, 1973)
(statement of James Harper) (tapes on file with the author).
214. Id. (statement of James Harper).
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port a presumption that same-sex marriages were excluded.215
"[L]egislative intent is quite a two-edged sword and an extremely
strong argument can be made whereby.., the Legislature didn't expressly rule out a homosexual marriage, they just never considered a
homosexual2 16marriage. . . . [C]an you imply omission from
exclusion?

Ultimately, the Texas Legislature adopted H.B. 103 to amend Family Code section 1.01, with language added to the original amendment
which appears to have been intended to carry out Harper's suggestion.2 17 "A license may not be issued for the marriageof persons of the
same sex." 218 Since Representative Nabors' original amendment did
not include any reference to persons of the same sex, it is reasonable
to infer that the language actually adopted may be attributed at least
in part to the testimony of the South Texas Law School students.
On the other hand, proponents of same-sex marriage may argue this
amendment only prevents same-sex couples from obtaining a marriage license in Texas, and therefore leaves open the question of the
validity of same-sex marriages contracted in other states. This argument may have merit. Indeed, it seems logical to conclude that if the
Texas Legislature was not satisfied with presuming exclusion of samesex marriages from the language of statutory provisions (and hence
passed H.B. 103, as amended), neither should it presume same-sex
marriages validly contracted in other states will be invalidated based
on a Texas statute which merely prohibits issuing a marriage license to
two individuals of the same sex. Consequently, based on the plain
language of Family Code section 1.01, in addition to its legislative history, courts may find this section is not a "local law" which would
prohibit same-sex marriages validly contracted in other states under
the most significant relationship test.
2. Texas Judicial Precedents
Since it may be argued that Texas does not have an express statutory provision precluding same-sex marriages, the next step in the analytical process is to review pertinent judicial precedents in this area.
215. Id (statement of James Harper).
216. 1d (statement of James Harper).
217. Although Harper suggested wording along the lines of "[N]o marriage shall be
valid within the meaning of this Code except that it be between a male ... and a
female. . ." the language actually enacted reads, "A license may not be issued for the
marriage of persons of the same sex." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.01 (West 1993).
Had the Texas Legislature adopted the exact language proposed by Harper regarding
same-sex marriages, it seems clear that Texas law would expressly prohibit same-sex
marriages. This would have prevented the present ambiguity which arises from the
language of the licensing statute.

218. TEx.

FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 1.01 (West 1993) (emphasis added).
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To date, no cases regarding same-sex marriage have been officially
reported in Texas.219
Generally, however, marriage in Texas has always been regarded as
a union between members of the opposite sex. For example, in Grigsby v. Reib,2 ° the Texas Supreme Court stated: "[T]he correct definition of marriage ... is ... the relation of husband and wife....
Marriage is not a contract, but a status created by mutual consent of
one man and one woman."'221 Furthermore, "[o]ne of the definitions
of the term 'marriage' . . . is, 'The civil status of a man and woman
lawfully united in the relation of husband and wife ....222 In fact, in
Gowin v. Gowin,223 the Texas Commission of Appeals, discussing who
may marry, stated in dicta: "Many of those with contractual power [to
marry] in all respects may not do so; for instance, a man and a man, a
woman and a woman .... ,224 However, the Texas Supreme Court
only adopted the judgment of the Commission in Gowin, and not the
opinion. It is thus unclear how much credence this opinion would be
given in court today.
3. Texas Public Policy Regarding Same-Sex Marriage
Even if Texas has not statutorily or judicially prohibited same-sex
marriages, the public policy of the state may be so strong as to invalidate these unions. Where do courts find public policy? In general,
"[e]ach state in the union has the power, by constitutional or statutory
enactments, to declare its own public policy. '2 Public policy is found
in "legislative declarations, or, in their absence, from judicial decisions, ' 12 6 rather than the general public opinion. Further, the principle underlying this concept is that it represents the best interest of the
general public:
[Plublic policy is that principle of the law which holds that 'no one'
can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the
. In a judicial sense, public
public or against the public good ...
policy does not mean simply sound policy or good policy, but it
means the policy of a state established227for the public weal either by
law, by courts, or by general consent.
219. But see supra notes 201-204 and accompanying text, discussing the "marriage"
of two Houston men after they fraudulently obtained a marriage license from the
Wharton County clerk.
220. 153 S.W. 1124 (Tex. 1913).
221. Id. at 1129-30.
222. McCracken v. Taylor, 146 S.W. 693, 695 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1912, no
writ).
223. 292 S.W. 211 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judgm't adopted).
224. Id. at 213 (emphasis added).
225. American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Coates, 246 S.W. 356, 358 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923,
judgm't adopted).
226. Id. at 359.
227. Cheney v. Coffey, 113 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1938, judgm't
adopted) (emphasis added).
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Thus, there are several areas to which Texas courts may look to find
public policy regarding same-sex marriages. 28 First, Texas may look
to the policy reasons offered by its own courts, as well as that of other
courts which have refused to recognize the right to same-sex marriage.
Courts faced with this decision may also look to Texas Attorney General opinions on the issue for guidance. Last, Texas may look at its
legislative decisions which may reflect public policy.
a. Public Policy in Court Decisions
Other state courts have resorted to a number of public policy reasons to restrict marriage to only opposite-sex couples, and procreation
is the rationale perhaps most often espoused by courts.22 9 In Singer v.
Hara,2 30 for example, the Washington Court of Appeals determined:
The fact remains that marriage exists as a protected legal institution
primarily because of societal values associated with the propagation
of the human race. Further, it is apparent that no same-sex couple
offers the possibility of the birth of children by their union. Thus
the refusal of the state to authorize same-sex marriage results from
than from an invidious
[the] impossibility of reproduction' 23rather
1
discrimination "on account of sex.
Furthermore, the Texas Commission of Appeals determined in Gowin
v. Gowin232 that "the first cause and reason of matrimony ought to be
the design of having offspring ....233 Notwithstanding judicial reliance on this argument, however, many proponents of same-sex unions
have thoroughly criticized this rationale as unsound.2 34 Indeed, a regulation mandating that a married couple must bear offspring would
clearly be unconstitutional. Why, then, should same-sex couples who
lack the ability to procreate between themselves be denied marital
status on this basis? Restricting marriage to only couples who can (in
theory, if not in practice) procreate will not encourage reproduction
among these same-sex couples. "Only in the unlikely event that the
228. Proponents of same-sex marriage argue there are equally compelling reasons
for upholding these marriages, such as the strong presumption in favor of finding a
valid marriage, spousal benefits, the effect on children of the union, certainty, and
upholding the parties' valid expectations. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 14, at 1064-65.
229. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (marriage
uniquely involves "the procreation and rearing of children within a family"); Dean v.
District of Columbia, No. CIV.A.90-13892, 1992 WL 685364 *1, *4 (D.C. Super. June
2, 1995) (mem.) ("the interest in fostering ... that which is essential to the very
survival of the human race, namely, procreation" is a compelling state interest which
justifies a prohibition against same-sex marriage); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195,
1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
230. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
231. Id at 1195.
232. 292 S.W. 211 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judgm't adopted).
233. Id. at 214; see also Grigsby v. Reib, 153 S.W. 1124, 1126 (Tex. 1913) (the union
of one man and one woman in marriage "is intended ... for the benefit of their
common offspring").
234. See, e.g., Keane, supra note 14, at 517-19.
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couple entered the state despite its policy, accepted the invalidation of
their marriage, and then paired up with members of the opposite sex
to reproduce, would the state's policy be advanced. 2 35 In fact, since
many of these individuals have children from previous heterosexual
unions or through adoption, extending the marital status to these
couples would seem to be in the children's best interests for reasons of
economic benefits, certainty, and a stable home life. Based on these
reasons, Texas opponents to same-sex marriage may have a difficult
time using procreation as a legitimate justification to withhold marital
status from same-sex couples.
Other jurisdictions have also relied on the argument that since marriage has traditionally been regarded as a relationship involving one
man and one woman, there is a strong policy in favor of protecting this
union to the exclusion of others. "Marriage was a custom long before
the state commenced to issue licenses for that purpose.... [M]arriage
has always been considered as the union of a man and a woman. 236
Proponents of same-sex marriage argue this policy discriminates
against homosexuals. Notwithstanding this contention, however, the
right to place restrictions on the marriage relationship lies with the
state, provided it acts within constitutional restraints. Thus, provided
Texas has valid reasons for allowing only men and women to marry,
relying on this traditional definition of marriage is a justified public
policy.
Texas may be successful in arguing that its statute restricts marriage
based on the inability of same-sex couples to fit the legal definition of
a marriage. An analogy may be useful at this point. In Texas, if two
individuals desire to begin a corporation, they must meet certain requirements under the Texas Business Corporation Act.2 37 For example, they must file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State
and have $1000 on file. 38 If the individuals fail to meet all of the
state's requirements, a de jure corporation is never formed. Stated
another way, the entrepreneurs did not form a corporation because
the state determines what constitutes a de jure corporation, and they
failed to meet the state's definition.
Applying this analysis to the same-sex marriage issue, it is clear that
the power to regulate marriage, and indeed define what it is, must
235. Id. at 518.
236. Jones v. Hallghan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973); see also Adams v. Hower-

ton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The term 'marriage' ordinarily contemplates
a relationship between a man and a woman."); Singer, 522 P.2d at 1197 (holding that
"marriage in this state, as elsewhere in the nation, has been deemed a private relationship of a man and a woman"); Dean v. District of Columbia, No. CIV.A.90-13892,
1992 WL 685364 *1, at *4 (D.C. Super. June 2, 1995) (mem.) (allowing same-sex marriage could "constitute unprecedented and unwarranted 'social tinkering' with one of
the most sacred institutions known to mankind, namely, marriage ....
237. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 3.01-.03 (West 1980 & Supp. 1996).
238. Id. art. 3.01-.02.
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reside in the state, subject to constitutional constraints. Thus, where
courts have determined same-sex couples have failed to meet the definition of marriage in the state, that is a valid reason for rejecting the
union, provided the statute defining marriage in the state has a legitimate basis.
The case of Baehr v. Lewin may hold the key to Texas' legitimate
basis for refusing to validate same-sex marriages. As the Hawaii
Supreme Court correctly stated, the Hawaii statute restricts marriage
on the basis of sex, rather than sexual orientation. Is there a valid
reason why Texas - or other states -

should not allow couples of the

same sex to marry, notwithstanding the couple's sexual orientation?
Consider, for example, if a heterosexual Texas woman desires to
marry a good friend who also happens to be a woman. Although
neither woman desires to enter a marital relationship with a man, they
each hope to gain the economic benefits of marriage. These women
clearly cannot obtain a marriage license in Texas today. They would
be denied not on the basis of their sexual orientation - heterosexuality - but rather on the basis of their sex. Thus, the women logically
might contend that the Texas law prohibiting same-sex marriage violates their fundamental right to marry on the basis of sex. In answer
to this contention, it is possible the state could demonstrate it would
be harmful to the sanctity of marriage to authorize it between individuals of the same sex who merely desired to enter a marital state for
economic gain.2 39

Moreover, the impact to the federal Social Security system would
be tremendous if same-sex marriages are recognized in all states. It
has already become questionable whether the Social Security system
will be solvent in the not-too-distant future. Allowing same-sex partners to marry and consequently obtain their spouse's social security
benefits will only hasten the threatened bankruptcy of the system.
Similar financial distress may be visited upon employers who provide
health care benefits to employees' spouses if this new category of marriages is approved. Thus, the state likely has more than one legitimate
policy reason which may allow Texas to restrict marriage to only individuals of the opposite sex.
b. Public Policy in Texas Attorney General Opinions
Two opinions were issued in 1972 by Texas Attorney General Crawford C. Martin related to same-sex marriages. In the first opinion,
rendered September 14, 1972, the Attorney General responded to a
request for an opinion as to whether a county clerk was authorized to
239. See Grigsby v. Reib, 153 S.W. 1124, 1129 (Tex. 1913) ("Contract marriages
exist when the parties, for some pecuniary or social advantages, have desecrated the
sacred status by their union; and such marriages often furnish business to the divorce
courts and scandals to society.").
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issue a marriage license to individuals of the same sex.240 Looking to
the common law and how Texas courts previously defined marriage,
the Attorney General held the clerk could not authorize such a license.241 According to the Attorney General, confusion regarding
what the Texas Family Code deemed a valid marriage could be resolved by application of the rules of statutory construction. 242 "In the
instant situation, since the Legislature has permeated the Family Code
...

with the terms 'husband,' 'wife,' and 'marriage,' and since the Leg-

islature must be presumed to know the definitions and usage of these
words, it is eminently clear that under Texas law only two persons
'243 of
the opposite sex may be granted a license to marry in Texas.
In the second opinion, rendered December 5, 1972, the question
posed was whether two Texas men could acquire the status of
marriage. 24
Marriage has been defined in Texas as the voluntary union for life
of one man and one woman as husband and wife, to the exclusion of
all others, for the discharge, to each other and to the community, of
the duties legally incumbent on those whose association is founded
on the distinction of sex.
...
The Texas Courts have held that since the state controls what
determines the marriage status, it may strip certain classes of their
contractual powers in regard to entering into the marriage
relationship.
The Attorney General determined that since the Texas Legislature
consistently used the terms husband, wife, and marriage throughout
the Family Code, and "since the [L]egislature must be presumed to
know the definition and usage of these words, it is clear under both
statutory law in Texas and Texas 24common
laws that only two persons
6
of the opposite sex may marry.

c. Public Policy in Texas Statutes
As discussed above, Texas does not have an express statute prohibiting same-sex marriage, although the Family Code does prohibit issuance of a marriage license to two individuals of the same sex. Two
other Texas statutes which should be considered in the context of this
240. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. M-1216 (1972).

241. Id. (citing Grigsby v. Reib, 153 S.W. 1124 (Tex. 1913) and Janeli v. Janelli, 216
S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1948, rev'd on other grounds)).
242. Id. at 5966.

243. Id.

244. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. M-1277 (1972). This query was in response to the

purported marriage between Texas two men which occurred in October 1972, after

they obtained a marriage license by fraud.
245. Id. at 6272 (citing McCracken v. Taylor, 146 S.W. 693 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1912, no writ); Simpson v. Simpson, 380 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); and Gowin v. Gowin, 292 S.W. 211 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927,
judgm't adopted)).

246. Id.
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issue are Texas Penal Code sections 21.01247 and 21.06.24 8 Texas is one
of several states which still statutorily prohibits the act of sodomy.
Specifically, section 21.06 criminalizes homosexual conduct: "A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse
with another individual of the same sex. '2 49 Deviate sexual intercourse
is described in section 21.01 as "any contact between any part of the
' 250
genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person.
These two statutes, read in tandem, criminalize the consummation
of a same-sex marriage. Consequently, it may be argued that these
statutes express a strong policy against allowing these unions. Following the rationale of the Dean v. Districtof Columbia25 1 court, restricting marriage to opposite-sex unions may be permissible where it is "to
protect the sacred institution of marriage from such a radical transformation and redefinition that its very 'consummation' by the marital
partners would be biologically impossible and the anticipated sexual
intimacies of said partners immoral and, under the current state of the
'252
law, illegal.
Based on Texas statutes, judicial decisions, and public policy, it is
likely that most Texas courts faced with determining the validity of a
same-sex marriage contracted in another jurisdiction would hold the
marriage to be void. However, determining which state's law will apply under choice of law analysis does not end the inquiry. Constitutional limits on the state's police power to regulate marriage must also
be considered.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE STATE'S RIGHT TO
REGULATE MARRIAGE

In any conflicts of law issue, it is imperative that the court ensure
two important constitutional mandates are upheld: Due Process, and
Full Faith and Credit. Thus, a brief discussion 253 of how constitutional
law may affect state decisions to void same-sex marriages celebrated
in sister states is in order.
In analyzing constitutional limitations on choice of law issues, the
Supreme Court has intermingled the principles inherent in the Due
247. TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. § 21.01 (West 1994).
248. Id. § 21.06.
249. Id § 21.06(a).
250. Id § 21.01 (1)(A).
251. No. CIV.A.90-13892, 1992 WL 685364 (D.C. Super. June 2, 1992) (mem.), affd
per curiam, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995).
252. Id. at *8.
253. As discussed supra in notes 11-14, the constitutionality of this issue has previously been analyzed by numerous authorities. It would add little at this point to reexamine these arguments in great detail. This is especially true in light of Congress'

proposed Defense of Marriage Act, which would leave resolution of this matter up to
the individual state. See 142 CONG. REc. S4851-02 (daily ed. May 9, 1996).
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Process Clause and Full Faith and Credit Clause. 254 Nevertheless,
these two constitutional limitations should be applied so as to protect
different rights.2 55 Thus, "[d]ue process analysis should center on the
parties and ask questions about fairness, surprise, and expectations.
Full faith and credit analysis should focus on the role of the states as
sovereigns and inquire
into the proper relations among sovereigns in a
256
federal union.
A.

Due Process

As a constitutional limitation to choice of law, "[t]he Due Process
Clause addresses issues of the territorial reach of state power and the
fairness to individuals in the exercise of that power. '257 "[F]or a
State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible
manner, that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. ' 258 Thus, under the Due
Process Clause, the United States Supreme Court requires that for
Texas (the forum state) to apply its local law rather than the law of
Hawaii, Texas must have a sufficient relationship to the issue in
question.259
For example, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,260 the Supreme
Court determined that Kansas' contacts to a class action suit brought
in the state's court by gas royalty owners were insufficient to apply
Kansas law.2 6 ' In Shutts, the lessors owned land in eleven states, but

fewer than three percent of the plaintiffs and one percent of the leases
had any "apparent connection" with Kansas.262 The Supreme Court
held that even though Kansas had an interest in regulating Phillips'
conduct in the state, 63 "[g]iven Kansas' lack of 'interest' in claims unrelated to that State,

. .

. application of Kansas law to every claim in

this case
is sufficiently arbitrary and unfair as to exceed constitutional
limits. ' '26 The Court concluded:
254.

EUGENE

WILLIAM

M.

F.

SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS

RICHMAN & WILLIAM

L.

§ 3.20, at 79 (1982);

REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF

§ 95, at 282 (2d ed. 1993) ("The Court, obviously enough, views the two provisions as synonymous.").
255. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 322 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
256. RICHMAN, supra note 254, § 95, at 283.
LAWS

257. SCOLES, supra note 254, § 3.20, at 80.

258. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)).

259.

SCOLES,

supra note 254, § 3.21, at 81-82.

260. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).

261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

821-22.
814-15.
819.
822 (emphasis added).
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Neither the Due Process Clause nor the Full Faith and Credit
Clause requires Kansas "to substitute for its own [laws], applicable
to persons and events within it, the conflicting statute of another
state," but Kansas "may not abrogate the rights of parties beyond
its borders having no relation to anything done or to be done within
them. 26 5

In the instant case, where a couple marries in Hawaii and moves to
Texas, there is little doubt that Texas would have "a significant contact
or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such
'266
that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.
Not only would the couple be domiciled in the state, but they would
likely be employed in the state, own property interests in the state,
and have numerous other significant contacts. Thus, Due Process fairness - would be upheld where Texas law applied in this context.
B. Full Faith and Credit
Assuming arguendo that Hawaii will fail to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest to uphold the sex-based classification, will
other states be forced to recognize same-sex marriages originating in
Hawaii under the Full Faith and Credit Clause? 267 "Full Faith and
Credit... balances conflicting state interests by commanding that the
'268
states respect the sovereignty of sister states in a federal context.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution
provides, "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State. '269 Nevertheless, this provision does not necessarily mandate
that Texas must recognize Hawaiian same-sex marriages for several
reasons.
Although some commentators have argued that Full Faith and
Credit compels recognition of marriages which occur in sister states,27 °
validity of marriage cases have traditionally been decided under
choice of law. Further, the United States Supreme Court has held
"the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a State to apply
' 271
another State's law in violation of its own legitimate public policy."
Thus, even where the Full Faith and Credit Clause would otherwise
dictate that Texas recognize a same-sex marriage, if the marriage was
265. Id. at 822 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting Pacific Employees
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939), and Home Ins. Co.
v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930), respectively).
266. Phillips,472 U.S. at 818 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 31213 (1981)).
267. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
268. SCOLES, supra note 254, § 3.20, at 80.
269. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
270. See Balian, supra note 18, at 406-09; Cordell, supra note 18, at 264-71.
271. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979).
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contrary to a strong Texas public policy, Texas would not be required
to uphold the marriage as valid.
Finally, the United States Congress is poised to settle the Full Faith
and Credit argument regarding same-sex marriages once and for all.
In early 1996, the Defense of Marriage Act was introduced to "define
and protect the institution of marriage. 272 This bill will allow "each
State to decide for itself what legal effect it will give to another State's
same-sex 'marriages.' ' 2 73 Specifically, the bill provides:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship.274
The bill further defines marriage as "a legal union between one man
and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers
2 75
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.
The Defense of Marriage Act, if passed, will effectively foreclose
arguments that other states must recognize Hawaii's same-sex marriages under Full Faith and Credit, and leave that issue to the respective state's decision under a conflict of laws analysis. Since
congressional support for the Act appears strong,2 76 it is likely the issue of same-sex marriage may be decided solely on the basis of each
respective state's choice of law, without regard to Full Faith and
Credit.
CONCLUSION

Whether Texas must recognize same-sex marriages contracted in
other jurisdictions will most likely not be determined by Due Process
or Full Faith and Credit considerations. Even if Texas does not have
the most significant relationship to the couple, it may be argued that,
notwithstanding Full Faith and Credit, the marriage is nevertheless
272. 142 CONG. REC.S4851-02, *S4869 (1996).
273. Id. at *$4871.
274. Id. at *$4870. Congress is authorized to take this action under Article IV,
Section 1 of the Constitution, which reads::-,
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added).

275. 142 CONG. REC. S4851-02, *54870 (1996).
276. On July 13, 1996, the House passed this action and sent it on to the Senate for
consideration. David Jackson, House Overwhelmingly Passes Federal Ban on Gay
Marriages; Bill Would Deny Spousal Benefits to Same-Sex Couples, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 13, 1996, at Al. President Clinton has indicated he will sign the
Defense of Marriage Act if it survives Congressional scrutiny.
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void if it offends a legitimate Texas public policy. As a result, validity
of the marriage will most likely be decided under Texas' choice of law
analysis. Thus, where Texas has the most significant relationship to
the marriage and the couple, Texas local law will determine whether
the marriage will be recognized.
Based on the legislative history of Family Code section 1.01, it appears the Texas Legislature intended to bar marriages contracted in
Texas between two individuals of the same sex. Without further
amendment to the law, it is conceivable the State may successfully
argue Texas local law voids any same-sex marriage - even one validly
entered in another jurisdiction - where Texas has the most significant
relationship to the issue in question. However, if the Texas Legislature desires to have same-sex marriage cases resolved consistently and
cleanly, it should consider adopting an explicit statute which makes it
clear that same-sex marriages are absolutely void in Texas and will not
be recognized, regardless of where the marriage is celebrated. For example, the Tennessee Legislature is considering an express provision
which states:
(a) It is hereby declared to be the public policy of this state to recognize the union only of man and woman. No same-sex marriage
shall be recognized as entitled to the benefits of marriage.
(b) Marriages between persons of the same sex are prohibited in
this state. Any marriage entered into by persons of the same sex,
where such license is issued by another state or foreign jurisdiction,
shall be void in this state and any contractual rights granted by virtue of such license, including
2 its termination, shall be unenforceable
in the courts of this state.
277. S.B. 2305, 99th Gen. Assembly, 2d R.S. (Tenn. 1995). Numerous other states
have similar legislation pending. See H.B. 142, 1996 R.S. (Ala. 1996) ("Marriage between persons of the same sex shall not be deemed legitimate and shall be declared
void."); H.B. 1291, 60th Gen. Assembly, 2nd R.S. (Colo. 1996) ("The following marriages are prohibited: ... A marriage between persons of the same sex."); S.B. 680,
143rd Gen. Assembly, R.S. (Ga. 1995) ("It is hereby declared to be the public policy
of this state to recognize the union only of man and woman. No same-sex marriage
shall be recognized as entitled to the benefits of marriage. Marriages between persons of the same sex are prohibited in this state. Any marriage entered into by persons of the same sex, where such license is issued by another state or foreign
jurisdiction, shall be void in this state and any contractual rights granted by virtue of
such license, including its termination, shall be unenforceable in the courts of this
state."); S.B. 1773, 89th Gen. Assembly, R.S. (Ill. 1995) (providing that a marriage
between two individuals of the same sex is prohibited); S.B. 895, 88th Gen. Assembly,
2nd Sess. (Mo. 1996) ("All marriages ... between persons of the same sex ... are
presumptively void .... 9"); S.J.R. 10, 42nd Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 1996) ("All same-sex
marriages that are valid according to the laws of another state shall be considered
invalid in this state."). Several states currently have legislation which expressly voids
same-sex marriages. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 89 (West 1993) ("Persons of
the same sex may not contract marriage with each other."); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 363.021 (West Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (1996): 1996 Mich. Pub. Acts 334;
S.B. 1487, 1996 R.S., 1996 N.C. LAWS ch. 588; H.B. 4502, 1996 R.S., 1996 S.C. LAws
Acrs 327.
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By enacting a similar explicit provision, if Texas is the state with the
most significant relationship under the Duncan test, this express Texas
law would apply and invalidate the purported marriage.
Moreover, where a couple travels from Texas to marry in Hawaii,
fully aware that Texas law prohibits their marital union, the couple
may find it difficult to argue that they had reasonable expectations
their Hawaiian marriage would be recognized when they return to
Texas. Indeed, it is very likely the couple will return to Texas fully
expecting to fight an uphill battle to have their marriage recognized.
Further, regarding the argument for certainty, once Texas law is clear
as to what marriages will not be recognized in the state, purported
same-sex marriages can be dismissed with minimal judicial time and
expense.
In addition, such a provision would also clearly set forth Texas public policy on the issue of same-sex marriage for consideration in the
most significant relationship's balancing test.278 All of these factors
together undoubtedly strengthen Texas' interests and weigh in favor
of finding that Texas has the most significant relationship to a couple,
and thus Texas law - which would clearly prohibit recognition of the
same-sex union if the above express provision were adopted - would
apply.
Last, if Baehr v. Lewin is decided as expected, Texas courts may be
faced with determining the validity of same-sex unions in a matter of
months. Regardless of whether the Legislature decides to support or
deny these marriages, it should take immediate steps when it reconvenes to give Texas courts the proper analytical structure to resolve
these cases with consistency and certainty. If Texas opts to take a
wait-and-see approach rather than meeting this controversial issue
head-on, the likely outcomes are increased litigation, public uncertainty, and conflicting court decisions.
Sondrea Joy King

278.
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